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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-2842 
_____________ 
 
UNIVERSITY SPINE CENTER 
on assignment of John W., 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
AETNA, INC.;  
JOHN DOE, being a fictitious name for the Plan  
Administrator whose identity is presently unknown 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2:18-cv-02823) 
District Judge:  Hon. William J. Martini 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 1, 2019 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, and SILER, JR.,+ Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 16, 2019) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
                                              
+ The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Senior United States Circuit Judge for the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal concerns a medical provider’s standing to bring a claim against an 
insurer in the face of an anti-assignment provision in the insured’s medical benefits plan 
governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 
U.S.C. § 1001, et seq.  Because we conclude that the provision unambiguously prohibits 
the insured from assigning his rights under the plan, we will affirm the District Court’s 
order dismissing the medical provider’s complaint with prejudice.   
I. 
We write principally for the parties and therefore recite only those facts necessary 
to our decision.  The defendant, Aetna, Inc. (“Aetna”), administers healthcare plans.  J.W. 
was a participant in one such plan.  The plaintiff, University Spine Center (“USC”), 
performed surgery on J.W.   In connection therewith, J.W. “transferred all of his rights to 
benefit payments under his insurance plan, as well as all of his related rights under 
[ERISA],” to USC.  Joint Appendix (“JA”) 8.  USC sought reimbursement from Aetna 
for the services rendered to J.W., but was only partially reimbursed.   
Thereafter, USC filed a complaint against Aetna for, among other things, “fail[ure] 
to make payments pursuant to the controlling Plan.”  JA10.  USC alleged that the 
aforementioned assignment to USC by J.W. enabled USC to bring the suit.  Aetna moved 
to dismiss the complaint in its entirety on the basis that an anti-assignment provision in 
J.W.’s insurance plan deprived USC of standing.  That provision reads:  “Coverage and 
your rights under this plan may not be assigned.  A direction to pay a provider is not an 
assignment of any right under this plan or of any legal or equitable right to institute any 
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court proceeding.”  JA114.  The District Court agreed with Aetna and granted the motion 
to dismiss.  USC timely appealed.   
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and our 
jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo a district court’s dismissal 
of a complaint for lack of standing.  N. Jersey Brain & Spine Ctr. v. Aetna, Inc., 801 F.3d 
369, 371 (3d Cir. 2015).  In doing so, we “accept as true all material allegations set forth 
in the complaint[] and . . . construe those facts in [USC’s] favor.”  In re Schering Plough 
Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007)).1  Additionally, we “only 
consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein,” such as 
                                              
1 We note here that although Aetna moved to dismiss USC’s complaint for lack of 
standing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the District Court analyzed the 
motion as a factual attack regarding subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).  
See Hartig Drug Co. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining 
that “[w]hen considering a factual challenge, the plaintiff [has] the burden of proof that 
jurisdiction does in fact exist, the court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as 
to the existence of its power to hear the case, . . . no presumptive truthfulness attaches to 
[the] plaintiff’s allegations,” and “a court may weigh and consider evidence outside the 
pleadings”) (second and third alterations in original) (citations and quotation marks 
omitted).  The District Court erred in analyzing Aetna’s motion as a factual challenge 
under Rule 12(b)(1).  Although, “[o]rdinarily, Rule 12(b)(1) governs motions to dismiss 
for lack of standing,” whether a party has derivative standing to file an ERISA claim 
“involves a merits-based determination,” such that a motion to dismiss for lack of ERISA 
standing — like the one at issue —  is “properly filed under Rule 12(b)(6).”  N. Jersey 
Brain & Spine Ctr., 801 F.3d at 371 n.3.  Still, we need not vacate and remand for the 
District Court to consider the motion using the correct standard, as “we may affirm on 
any basis supported by the record.”  Hartig Drug Co., 836 F.3d at 273 (quoting Davis v. 
Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 350 (3d Cir. 2016)).  Accordingly, “we [now] consider 
whether the District Court could have granted [Aetna’s] motion to dismiss under the Rule 
12(b)(6) framework.”  Id.   
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J.W.’s healthcare plan, which USC references in its complaint.  Am. Orthopedic & Sports 
Med. v. Independence Blue Cross Blue Shield, 890 F.3d 445, 449 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting 
In re Schering Plough Corp., 678 F.3d at 243).   
III.  
USC challenges the District Court’s determination that the anti-assignment 
provision at issue is unambiguous and, more chiefly, argues that the court erroneously 
concluded — based on an alleged misinterpretation of American Orthopedic — that the 
provision deprived USC of standing to bring its claim.  We address these arguments in 
turn.   
A.  
To begin, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the anti-assignment 
provision is unambiguous.  Contractual language is unambiguous if it is “capable of only 
one objectively reasonable interpretation.”  Baldwin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 636 
F.3d 69, 76 (3d Cir. 2011).  When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, we 
consider its words, “the alternative meaning suggested by counsel, and the nature of the 
objective evidence to be offered in support of that meaning.”  Id. (quoting Mellon Bank, 
N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 (3d Cir. 1980)).   
 Again, the anti-assignment provision advises:  “Coverage and your rights under 
this plan may not be assigned.  A direction to pay a provider is not an assignment of any 
right under this plan or of any legal or equitable right to institute any court proceeding.”  
JA114.  There is only one reasonable interpretation of that language, and that is that J.W. 
was prohibited from assigning his rights to benefit payments.  Cf. City of Hope Nat’l 
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Med. Ctr. v. HealthPlus, Inc., 156 F.3d 223, 229 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that an anti-
assignment clause, which provided that “[a]ll entitlements of a member to receive 
covered rights are personal and may not be assigned,” was “clear”). 
USC argues that a direction to pay a healthcare provider is synonymous with an 
assignment of benefits and, as evidenced by the second sentence of the anti-assignment 
provision, is not prohibited.  We disagree and conclude that the provision may only be 
reasonably read as setting forth in the first sentence a prohibition on the assignment of the 
right to receive benefit payments and clarifying in the second sentence that directing the 
insurer to pay a healthcare provider directly will not assign that healthcare provider any 
of the insured’s rights under the plan or his right to sue.  Thus, we uphold the District 
Court’s conclusion that the provision is unambiguous.2   
B.  
Next, we address USC’s argument that the District Court erred in determining that 
the anti-assignment provision deprived USC of standing.  “Section 502(a) of ERISA 
empowers ‘a participant or beneficiary’ to bring a civil action ‘to recover benefits due to 
him under the terms of his plan.’”  N. Jersey Brain & Spine Ctr., 801 F.3d at 372 (quoting 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)).  A healthcare provider is neither a “participant” nor a “beneficiary” 
                                              
2 USC challenges the District Court’s failure to explain why it was not persuaded 
by the opinion of another district court that denied a motion to dismiss involving a nearly 
identical anti-assignment provision.  Nonetheless, we affirm the court’s conclusion based 
on our de novo review of the provision.  Sköld v. Galderma Labs. L.P., 917 F.3d 186, 
191 n.9 (3d Cir. 2019) (“The determination of ‘[w]hether a contract is ambiguous is an 
issue of law subject to plenary review.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Mylan Inc. v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 419 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
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for purposes of ERISA, but it may acquire standing to file suit under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) if it obtains “a valid assignment of benefits by a plan participant or 
beneficiary.”  Am. Orthopedic, 890 F.3d at 449–50.  An anti-assignment clause in a 
health insurance plan governed by ERISA may preclude such an assignment.  See id. at 
455 (“[A]nti-assignment clauses in ERISA-governed health insurance plans are generally 
enforceable[.]”).   
ERISA does not provide clear guidance regarding anti-assignment clauses in 
welfare benefit plans.  Id. at 451.  We would ordinarily be obligated to create federal 
common law to fill that statutory gap.  See Teamsters Pension Tr. Fund of Phila. & 
Vicinity v. Littlejohn, 155 F.3d 206, 208 (3d Cir. 1998).  USC urges that this Court adopt 
the “modern approach” as the federal common law according to which we interpret anti-
assignment provisions in ERISA-governed health insurance plans.  That approach directs 
that an anti-assignment provision only actually precludes assignment if it negates or 
limits one’s power, as opposed to one’s right, to assign.  See Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite 
(Pty) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 441–43 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining the modern approach and 
applying it in a non-ERISA case decided under New Jersey law).  An anti-assignment 
provision deprives an assignor of the power to assign if it “state[s] that nonconforming 
assignments (i) shall be ‘void’ or ‘invalid,’ or (ii) that the assignee shall acquire no rights 
or the nonassigning party shall not recognize any such assignment.”  Id. at 442. 
This case does not require development of federal common law, however, because 
American Orthopedic controls.  There, we determined that “anti-assignment clauses in 
ERISA-governed health insurance plans are enforceable” and, critically, held that the 
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clause at issue was enforceable.  Am. Orthopedic, 890 F.3d at 448, 455.  We reached our 
conclusion regarding the enforceability of anti-assignment provisions by relying on the 
holdings of six other United States Courts of Appeals that “nothing in ERISA forecloses 
plan administrators from freely negotiating anti-assignment clauses,” id. at 453 
(collecting cases), and the “black-letter law that the terms of an unambiguous private 
contract must be enforced,” id. (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 
150 (2009)).  We then determined that the anti-assignment clause at issue was 
enforceable and deprived the healthcare provider of standing to bring its ERISA claim.  
Id. at 455.  That provision featured the following language:  “[T]he right of a Member to 
receive benefit payments under this Program is personal to the Member and is not 
assignable in whole or in part to any person, Hospital, or other entity.”  Id. at 448.   
Thus, American Orthopedic held (at least implicitly) that an anti-assignment 
clause is valid if unambiguous, even if it does not provide that a “nonconforming 
assignment[] (i) shall be ‘void’ or ‘invalid,’ or (ii) that the assignee shall acquire no rights 
or the nonassigning party shall not recognize any such assignment.”   Bel-Ray, 181 F.3d 
at 442.  The anti-assignment provision at issue unambiguously prohibits assignment of 
J.W.’s right to benefit payments and is therefore enforceable, preventing USC from 
acquiring derivative standing to bring its ERISA claim.3 
                                              
3 We reject USC’s contention that the District Court ignored its arguments 
regarding the modern approach.  The court explained that the reason for its summary 
dismissal was because it had already rejected that same argument made by USC in a 
previous case, and USC failed to explain why the court should rule differently in this 
case.  In any event, this Court reviewed USC’s argument de novo.  See N. Jersey Brain & 
Spine Ctr., 801 F.3d at 371. 
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IV. 
For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court 
dismissing USC’s complaint for lack of standing.   
